Negation and partial axiomatizations of dependence and independence
  logic revisited by Yang, Fan
ar
X
iv
:1
60
3.
08
57
9v
5 
 [m
ath
.L
O]
  1
8 D
ec
 20
18
Negation and partial axiomatizations of dependence and
independence logic revisited✩
Fan Yang
Department of Values, Technology and Innovation, Delft University of Technology, Jaffalaan 5, 2628 BX
Delft, The Netherlands
Department of Mathematics and Statistics, PL 68 (Pietari Kalmin katu 5), 00014 University of Helsinki,
Finland
Abstract
In this paper, we axiomatize the negatable consequences in dependence and indepen-
dence logic by extending the systems of natural deduction of the logics given in [22]
and [11]. We prove a characterization theorem for negatable formulas in independence
logic and negatable sentences in dependence logic, and identify an interesting class
of formulas that are negatable in independence logic. Dependence and independence
atoms, first-order formulas belong to this class. We also demonstrate our extended sys-
tem of independence logic by giving explicit derivations for Armstrong’s Axioms and
the Geiger-Paz-Pearl axioms of dependence and independence atoms.
Keywords: dependence logic, team semantics, negation, existential second-order
logic
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1. Introduction
Dependence logic was introduced by Va¨a¨na¨nen [27] as a development of Henkin
quantifiers [13] and independence-friendly logic [14]. Recently, Gra¨del and Va¨a¨na¨nen
[10] defined a variant of dependence logic, called independence logic. The two log-
ics add to first-order logic new types of atomic formulas =(~x,y) and ~x ⊥~z ~y, called
dependence atom and independence atom, to explicitly specify the dependence and in-
dependence relations between variables. Intuitively, =(~x,y) states that “the value of
y is completely determined by the values of the variables in the tuple ~x ”, and ~x ⊥~z ~y
states that “given the values of the variables ~z, the values of ~x and the values of ~y
are completely independent of each other”. These properties cannot be meaningfully
manifested in single assignments of the variables. Therefore unlike the usual Tarskian
semantics where satisfaction relation is defined with respect to single assignments of
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a model, formulas of dependence and independence logic are evaluated on sets of as-
signments (called teams) instead. This semantics, introduced by Hodges [15, 16], is
called team semantics.
Dependence and independence logic are known to have the same expressive power
as existential second-order logic Σ11 (see [20] and [6]). This fact has two negative
consequences: The logics are not closed under classical negation and they are not
(effectively) axiomatizable. The aim of this paper is to shed some new light on these
problems.
Regarding the first problem, “negation”, being usually a desirable connective for a
logic, turns out to be a tricky connective in the context of team semantics. The negation
that dependence and independence logic inherit from first-order logic (denoted by ¬)
is a type of “syntactic negation”, in the sense that in order to compute the meaning
of the formula ¬φ, the negation ¬ has to be brought to the very front of the atomic
formulas by applying De Morgen’s laws and the double negation law. It was proved
that this negation ¬ is actually not a semantic operator [21], meaning that the semantic
equivalence of φ and ψ does not necessarily imply that ¬φ and ¬ψ are semantically
equivalent. The classical (contradictory) negation (denoted by ∼ in the literature),
on the other hand, is indeed a semantic operator. Whereas, neither dependence nor
independence logic is closed under classical negation, as the Σ11 fragment of second-
order logic is not. Dependence logic extended with the classical negation ∼ is called
team logic in the literature, and it was proved [19] to have the same expressive power
as full second-order logic.
Every formula φ of dependence and independence logic is satisfied by the empty
team, which in turn cannot satisfy the classical (contradictory) negation ∼ φ of the
formula. This implies that∼ φ cannot possibly be definable in dependence or indepen-
dence logic for any formula φ. This technical subtlety makes the classical contradictory
negation ∼ less interesting in the context of dependence and independence logic. In
this paper, we will, instead, consider the weak classical negation, denoted by ∼˙, which
behaves exactly as the classical negation except that on the empty team ∼˙φ is always
satisfied. We call a formula φ negatable in a logic if its weak classical negation ∼˙φ is
definable in the logic. We will prove a characterization theorem for negatable formulas
in independence logic and negatable sentences in dependence logic by generalizing an
argument in [27], from which it will follow that the problem of determining whether
a formula is negatable in independence logic or in dependence logic is undecidable.
Yet, we will identify an interesting class of formulas, presented as a hierarchy, that are
negatable in independence logic. First-order formulas, dependence and independence
atoms belong to this hierarchy. Formulas of this class are closely related to the de-
pendency notions considered in [8] and the generalized dependence atoms studied in
[23, 18].
As for the axiomatization problem, since Σ11 is not (effectively) axiomatizable, de-
pendence and independence logic cannot possibly be axiomatized in full. Nevertheless,
[22] and [11] defined systems of natural deduction for the logics such that the equiva-
lence
Γ |= φ ⇐⇒ Γ ⊢ φ (1)
holds if Γ is a set of sentences of dependence logic (or independence logic) and φ is
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a first-order sentence. It was left open whether these partial axiomatizations can be
generalized such that the above equivalence (1) holds if Γ is a set of formulas (that
possibly contain free variables) and φ is a first-order formula (that possibly contain
free variables too). Kontinen [17] gave such a generalization by expanding the signa-
ture with an extra relation symbol so as to interpret the teams associated with the free
variables. In this paper, we will generalize the partial axiomatization results in [22, 11]
via a different approach, an approach that makes essential use of the weak classical
negation. We extend the systems given in [22, 11] by adding an elimination rule for the
weak classical negation (∼˙E), and show that the equivalence (1) holds for the extended
systems if Γ is a set of formulas and φ is a formula that is negatable in the logics. It
should be noted that because the full class of negatable formulas is undecidable, as
mentioned above, the weak classical negation elimination rule ∼˙E and thus the full ex-
tended systems are undecidable. Nevertheless, by restricting the rule ∼˙E to decidable
subclasses of negatable formulas, such as the above-mentioned hierarchy of negatable
formulas, our systems can already have interesting applications. As an illustration, we
will give in this paper explicit derivations of Armstrong’s Axioms [2] and the Geiger-
Paz-Pearl axioms [9] in database theory in our extended system of independence logic,
and we will also demonstrate that Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem [3] in social choice
theory is derivable in the system too.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall the basics of dependence
and independence logic. Section 3 proves a characterization theorem for negatable
formulas or sentences in the logics. In Section 4 we extend the systems of natural
deduction of dependence and independence logic in [22, 11] to axiomatize negatable
consequences in the logics. Section 5 identifies a class of negatable formulas in in-
dependence logic, of which dependence and independence atoms are members. In
Section 6 we illustrate the extended system of independence logic by deriving Arm-
strong’s Axioms and the Geiger-Paz-Pearl axioms of dependence and independence
atoms in the system. We finish by making some concluding remarks in Section 7.
2. Preliminaries
Let us start by recalling the syntax and semantics (i.e. team semantics) of depen-
dence and independence logic.
We first fix the syntax of first-order logic. Given a signature L. First-order atomic
L-formulas λ are defined as usual. Well-formed L-formulas of first-order logic, also
called first-order formulas, (in negation normal form) are defined by the following
grammar:
φ ::= λ | ¬λ | ⊥ | φ∧φ | φ∨φ | ∃xφ | ∀xφ
where λ is an arbitrary first-order atomic L-formula.
Formulas will be evaluated on the usual first-order models over the signatureL. We
will use the same notationM for both a model and its domain, and assume thatM has
at least two elements. We write L(R) for the signature expanded from L by adding a
fresh relation symbolR, and (M,RM ) denotes the L(R)-expansion ofM in which the
k-ary relation symbolR is interpreted asRM ⊆Mk. We write φ(R) to emphasize that
the relation symbol R occurs in the formula φ.
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Although team semantics is intended for extensions of first-order logic obtained by
adding dependence or independence atoms, for the sake of comparison we will now
introduce the team semantics for first-order logic too. A team X of a modelM over a
set V of first-order variables is a set of assignments ofM over V , i.e., a set of functions
s : V →M . The set V is called the domain ofX , denoted by dom(X).
There is one and only one assignment of M over the empty domain, namely the
empty assignment /0. The singleton of the empty assignment { /0} is a team of M , and
the empty set /0 is a team ofM over any domain.
Let s be an assignment of M over V and a ∈M . We write s(a/x) for the as-
signment of M over V ∪{x} defined as s(a/x)(x) = a and s(a/x)(y) = s(y) for all
y ∈ V \ {x}. For any set N ⊆M and any function F :X → ℘(M)\ { /0}, define
X(N/x) = {s(a/x) : a ∈N, s ∈X}
and
X(F/x) = {s(a/x) : s ∈X and a ∈ F (s)}.
We write simply X(a/x) for X({a}/x). Denote by ~x or x a sequence x1, . . . ,xn
of variables and the length n will always be clear from the context or does not mat-
ter; similarly for a sequence ~F of functions and a sequence ~s of assignments. A
team X(N/x1) . . . (N/xn) will sometimes be abbreviated as X(N/~x), and a team
X(F1/x1) . . . (Fn/xn) asX(F1/x1, . . . ,Fn/xn) orX(~F/~x).
We now define the team semantics for first-order formulas. Note that our version
of the team semantics for disjunction and existential quantifier is known as the lax
semantics in the literature (see e.g., [6]).
Definition 2.1. Define inductively the notion of a first-order formula φ being satisfied
on a modelM and a teamX , denoted byM |=X φ, as follows:
• M |=X λ with λ a first-order atomic formula iff for all s ∈X , M |=s λ in the
usual sense.
• M |=X ¬λ with λ a first-order atomic formula iff for all s ∈X ,M 6|=s λ in the
usual sense.
• M |=X ⊥ iff X = /0.
• M |=X φ∧ψ iff M |=X φ andM |=X ψ.
• M |=X φ∨ψ iff there exist Y,Z ⊆X with X = Y ∪Z such thatM |=Y φ and
M |=Z ψ.
• M |=X ∃xφ iff M |=X(F/x) φ for some function F :X → ℘(M)\ { /0}.
• M |=X ∀xφ iff M |=X(M/x) φ.
A routine inductive proof shows that first-order formulas have the downward clo-
sure property and the union closure property:
(Downward Closure Property) M |=X φ and Y ⊆X implyM |=Y φ.
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(Union Closure Property) M |=Xi φ for all i ∈ I impliesM |=
⋃
i∈IXi φ.
which combined are equivalent to the flatness property:
(Flatness Property) M |=X φ ⇐⇒ M |={s} φ for all s ∈X .
It is easy to see that over singleton teams the team semantics for first-order formulas φ
coincides with the usual single-assignment semantics in the sense that
M |={s} φ ⇐⇒ M |=s φ (2)
holds for any modelM and assignment s. If φ is a first-order formula, then the string
¬φ, called the syntactic negation of φ, can be viewed as a first-order formula in nega-
tion normal form obtained in the usual way (i.e. by applying De Morgan’s laws, the
double negation law, etc.), and we write φ→ ψ for the formula ¬φ∨ψ. Since the
law of excluded middle φ∨¬φ holds for first-order formulas under the usual single-
assignment semantics, by Equivalence (2) we know thatM |={s} φ∨¬φ always holds,
which, together with the flatness property, implies that M |=X φ∨¬φ holds for all
teams X and models M . In other words, the law of excluded middle holds for first-
order formulas also in the sense of team semantics.
We now turn to dependence and independence logic. Well-formed L-formulas of
independence logic (I) are defined by the following grammar:
φ ::= λ | ¬λ | ⊥ | x1 . . .xn ⊥z1...zk y1 . . .ym |=(x1, . . . ,xn,y) | x1 . . .xn ⊆ y1 . . . yn |
φ∧φ | φ∨φ | ∃xφ | ∀xφ
where λ ranges over first-order atomic L-formulas. The formulas =(~x,y), ~x⊥~z ~y and
~x ⊆ ~y are called dependence atom, independence atom and inclusion atom, respec-
tively. We refer to any of these atoms as atoms of dependence and independence. For
the convenience of our argument in the paper, the independence logic as defined has
a richer syntax than the standard one in the literature, which has the same syntax as
first-order logic extended with independence atoms only. The other atoms are defin-
able in the standard independence logic; for a proof, see e.g., [5]. Dependence logic
(D), which is a fragment of I, is defined as first-order logic extended with dependence
atoms, and first-order logic extended with inclusion atoms is called inclusion logic. In
this paper we will only concentrate on dependence logic and independence logic.
The set Fv(φ) of free variables of a formula φ of I is defined as usual and we also
have the new cases for dependence and independence atoms:
• Fv(x1 . . .xn ⊥z1...zk y1 . . . ym) = {x1, . . . ,xn,y1, . . . ,ym,z1, . . . ,zk},
• Fv(=(x1, . . . ,xn,y)) = {x1, . . . ,xn,y},
• Fv(x1, . . . ,xn ⊆ y1, . . . ,yn) = {x1, . . . ,xn,y1, . . . ,yn}.
We write φ(~x) to indicate that the free variables occurring in φ are among ~x. A formula
φ is called a sentence if it has no free variable.
We write φ(t/x) for the formula obtained from φ by substituting uniformly ev-
ery free occurrence of the variable x for the term t. We sometimes abbreviate the
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substituted formula φ(t1/x1) · · · (tn/xn) as φ(~t/~x), and for a formula φ(~x) and a list
~w of fresh variables we sometimes also write φ(~w) for φ(~w/~x). We write s(~x) for
〈s(x1), . . . ,s(xn)〉.
Definition 2.2. Define inductively the notion of a formula φ of I being satisfied on a
model M and a team X , denoted by M |=X φ. All the cases are identical to those
defined in Definition 2.1 and additionally:
• M |=X ~x⊥~z ~y iff for all s,s
′ ∈X , s(~z) = s′(~z) implies that there exists s′′ ∈X
such that
s′′(~z) = s(~z) = s′(~z), s′′(~x) = s(~x) and s′′(~y) = s′(~y).
• M |=X =(~x,y) iff for all s,s
′ ∈X , s(~x) = s′(~x) implies s(y) = s′(y).
• M |=X ~x⊆ ~y iff for all s ∈X , there exists s
′ ∈X such that s′(~y) = s(~x).
We write ~x⊥ ~y for ~x⊥〈〉 ~y, and =(x) for=(〈〉,x), where 〈〉 is the empty sequence.
Note that the semantic clauses for ~x⊥ ~y and =(x) reduce to
• M |=X ~x⊥ ~y iff for all s,s
′ ∈X , there exist s′′ ∈X such that
s′′(~x) = s(~x) and s′′(~y) = s′(~y).
• M |=X =(x) iff for all s,s
′ ∈X , s(x) = s′(x).
A sentence φ is said to be true inM , writtenM |= φ, ifM |={ /0} φ. We write Γ |= ψ
if for any model M and team X , M |=X φ for all φ ∈ Γ implies M |=X ψ. We also
write φ |= ψ for {φ} |= ψ. If φ |= ψ and ψ |= φ, then we write φ≡ ψ.
We leave it for the reader to verify that formulas of dependence logic have the
downward closure property, and formulas of independence logic have the empty team
property and the locality property defined below:
(Empty Team Property) M |= /0 φ
(Locality Property) If {s ↾ Fv(φ) | s ∈X}= {s ↾ Fv(φ) | s ∈ Y }1, then
M |=X φ ⇐⇒ M |=Y φ.
Recall that the existential second-order logic (Σ11) consists of those formulas that
are equivalent to some formulas of the form ∃R1 . . .∃Rkφ, where φ is a first-order
formula. An L(R)-sentence φ(R) of Σ11 is said to be downward monotonewith respect
to R if (M,Q) |= φ(R) and Q′ ⊆ Q imply (M,Q′) |= φ(R). It is known that φ(R) is
downward monotone with respect to R if and only if φ(R) is equivalent to a sentence
1For an assignment s : V →M and a set V ′ ⊆ V of variables, we write s ↾ V ′ for the restriction of s to
the domain V ′.
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where R occurs only negatively (see e.g., [20]). A team X of M over {x1, . . . ,xn}
induces an n-ary relation
rel(X) := {(s(x1), . . . ,s(xn)) | s ∈X}
onM ; conversely, an n-ary relation RM onM induces a team
XR := {{(x1,a1), . . . ,(xn,an)} | (a1, . . . ,an) ∈R
M}.
Theorem 2.3 (see [27, 20, 6]). (i) Every L-sentence φ of I (or D) is equivalent to an
L-sentence τφ of Σ
1
1, i.e.,
M |= φ ⇐⇒ M |= τφ
holds for any L-modelM ; and conversely, every L-sentence ψ of Σ11 is equiva-
lent to an L-sentence ρ(ψ) of I (or D).
(ii) For every L-formula φ of I, there is an L(R)-sentence τφ(R) of Σ
1
1 such that for
all L-modelM and teamsX ,
M |=X φ ⇐⇒ (M,rel(X)) |= τφ(R).
If, in particular, φ is a formula of D, then the relation symbol R occurs in the
sentence τφ(R) only negatively.
(iii) For every L(R)-sentence ψ(R) of Σ11 that is downward monotone with respect to
R, there is an L-formula ρ(ψ) of D such that for all L-modelsM and teams X ,
M |=X ρ(ψ) ⇐⇒ (M,rel(X)) |= ψ(R)∨∀~x¬R~x. (3)
(iv) For every L(R)-sentence ψ(R) of Σ11, there is an L-formula ρ(ψ) of I such that
(3) holds for all L-modelsM and teams X .
In the sequel, we will use the notations τφ and τφ(R) to denote the (up to semantic
equivalence) unique formulas obtained in the above theorem and refer to them as the
Σ
1
1-translations of the formulas φ of D or I.
3. First-order formulas and negatable formulas
Formulas of dependence and independence logic can be translated into Σ11 (The-
orem 2.3). We thus use the term “first-order formula” in the team semantics setting
in two senses: A first-order formula φ can be viewed either as a formula of D or I
that is to be evaluated on teams, or as a usual formula of first-order logic that is to be
evaluated on single assignments and is possibly (equivalent to) the Σ11-translation τψ of
some formula ψ of D or I. With the latter reading,M |=s ¬φ iffM 6|=s φ holds for all
models M and assignments s, and the formula ¬φ is thus understood as the classical
(contradictory) negation of φ. However, on the team semantics side, unless the teamX
is a singleton,M 6|=X φ is in general not equivalent toM |=X ¬φ. To express the con-
tradictory negation in the team semantics setting, let us define the classical negation∼
and the weak classical negation ∼˙ as follows:
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• M |=X∼ φ iff M 6|=X φ,
• M |=X ∼˙φ iff eitherM 6|=X φ or X = /0.
Since formulas of dependence and independence logic have the empty team property,
the classical negation ∼ φ of any formula φ is not definable in the logics and we are
therefore not interested in the classical negation∼ in this paper. On the other hand, the
weak classical negation ∼˙φ can be definable in the logics for some formulas φ. We
say that a formula φ of I (or D) is negatable if there is a formula ψ of I (or D) such
that ∼˙φ≡ ψ. In this case, we also say that φ is negatable in I (or D).
For any first-order sentence φ, we have M 6|={ /0} φ iff M |={ /0} ¬φ by the law of
excluded middle. Thus ∼˙φ ≡ ¬φ, meaning that first-order sentences are negatable
both in D and in I. Recall that first-order formulas are flat, and we now prove that
negatable formulas of D are, actually, all flat.
Fact 3.1. If a formula φ of D is negatable, then it is upward closed (i.e. M |=X φ and
/0 6=X ⊆ Y implyM |=Y φ), and thus flat.
Proof. Suppose φ is a formula of D that is not upward closed. Then, there exist a
modelM and two teamsX 6= /0 and Y ⊇X such thatM |=X φ andM 6|=Y φ. But this
means that ∼˙φ is not downward closed and thus not definable in D.
We will see next that the above fact does not apply to independence logic. Also note
that sentences are always upward closed (since a sentence is true either on all teams or
on the empty team only). Thus, the converse direction of the above fact, if true, would
imply that all sentences of D are negatable. But this is not the case, as we will see
in the following characterization theorem for negatable sentences in D and negatable
formulas in I.
Theorem 3.2. (i) An L-formula φ of I is negatable if and only if its Σ11-translation
τφ(R) is equivalent to a first-order sentence.
(ii) An L-sentence φ of D is negatable if and only if its Σ11-translation τφ is equivalent
to a first-order sentence.
Before we give the proof the above theorem, let us make two remarks. First, the
theorem states that negatable formulas in I are exactly those formulas that have (essen-
tially) first-order translations, and negatable sentences in D are exactly those sentences
that have (essentially) first-order translations. Therefore the problem of determining
whether a formula of I or a sentence ofD is negatable reduces to the problem of deter-
mining whether a Σ11-sentence (τφ) is equivalent to a first-order formula, or whether the
second-order quantifiers in a Σ11-sentence can be eliminated. This problem is known to
be undecidable (this follows from e.g., [4]).
Next, we make some comments on yet another type of negation, the intuitionistic
negation. Abramsky and Va¨a¨na¨nen [1] introduced the intuitionistic implication (de-
noted by→ too) that has the semantics clause:
• M |=X φ→ ψ iff for all Y ⊆X ,M |=Y φ impliesM |=Y ψ.
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It is easy to check that if φ and ψ are first-order formulas, then φ→ ψ ≡ ¬φ∨ψ (and
thus our slight abuse of the notation → does not cause any essential problem). The
intuitionistic negation of a formula φ is defined (according to the usual convention) as
φ→⊥ and its semantics clause reduces to:
• M |=X φ→⊥ iff for all nonempty Y ⊆X ,M 6|=Y φ.
If a formula φ of D is negatable, then both φ and ∼˙φ are downward closed, and thus
∼˙φ ≡ φ→ ⊥. Also, for sentences the weak classical negation and the intuitionsitic
negation coincide, i.e., ∼˙φ≡φ→⊥ holds for φ being a sentence as well. However, the
intuitionistic negation φ→⊥ is not in the language of D or I, and in fact, its second-
order translation is in general a Π11-sentence, which is in general not expressible in D
or I (see [1, 28] for details). For an arbitrary formula φ, the intuitionistic negation
φ→⊥ is not necessarily equivalent to the weak classical negation ∼˙φ; for instance,
=(x)→⊥≡⊥ 6≡ ∼˙=(x).
Let us now turn to the proof of Theorem 3.2. Item (ii) actually follows implicitly
from the results in [27], and item (i) can be proved by essentially the argument of The-
orem 6.7 in [27]. For the convenience of the arugment, let us first direct our attention to
the Σ11 counterpart of dependence and independence logic and prove a general theorem
for Σ11.
Theorem 3.3. (i) Let φ(R) be an L(R)-formula of Σ11 such that (M, /0) |= φ(R) for
any L-model M . The formula ¬φ∨∀~x¬R~x belongs to Σ11 if and only if φ is
equivalent to a first-order formula.
(ii) Let φ be an L-formula of Σ11. The L-formula ¬φ belongs to Σ
1
1 if and only if φ is
equivalent to a first-order formula.
Proof. (i) It suffices to prove the direction “=⇒”. Suppose both φ and ¬φ∨∀~x¬R~x
belong to Σ11. We may assume without loss of generality that φ ≡ ∃S1 . . .∃Skψ and
(¬φ∨∀~x¬R~x) ≡ ∃T1 . . .∃Tmχ for some first-order formulas ψ and χ, and the rela-
tion variables S1, . . . ,Sk,T1, . . . ,Tm are fresh and pairwise distinct. Assume also that
φ(R) and ∃S1 . . .∃Skψ are L1(R)-formulas, and ¬φ(R)∨∀~x¬R~x and ∃T1 . . .∃Tmχ
are L2(R)-formulas.
Claim 1: ψ |= ¬χ∨∀~x¬R~x.
Proof of Claim 1. Put L = L1 ∪L2 ∪{R,S1, . . . ,Sk,T1, . . . ,Tm}. For any L-model
M such that M |= ψ, we have M |= ∃S1 . . .∃Skψ, thereby M |= φ. If R
M = /0, then
M |= ∀~x¬R~x, therebyM |= ¬χ∨∀~x¬R~x. If RM 6= /0, then we haveM |= ¬∀~x¬R~x.
Next, it follows that
M |= ¬¬φ∧¬∀~x¬R~x=⇒M |= ¬(¬φ∨∀~x¬R~x) =⇒M |= ¬∃T1 . . .∃Tmχ
=⇒M |= ∀T1 . . .∀Tm¬χ=⇒M |= ¬χ
=⇒M |= ¬χ∨∀~x¬R~x
as required. ⊣
Now, by Craig’s Interpolation Theorem of first-order logic, there exists a first-order
L1(R)∩L2(R)-formula θ such that ψ |= θ and θ |= ¬χ∨∀~x¬R~x.
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Claim 2: φ≡ θ.
Proof of Claim 2. For any L1(R)-modelM , if M |= φ, then (M,S
M
1 , . . . ,S
M
k ) |= ψ
for some relations SM1 , . . . ,S
M
k onM . Hence,M |= θ.
Conversely, for any L1(R)-model M such that M 6|= φ, we have R
M 6= /0 and
M |= ¬φ ∨ ∀~x¬R~x. The latter implies (M,TM1 , . . . ,T
M
m ) |= χ for some relations
TM1 , . . . ,T
M
m on M . It then follows that (M,T
M
1 , . . . ,T
M
m ) 6|= ¬χ∨∀~x¬R~x. Hence,
M 6|= θ. ⊣
(ii) The nontrivial direction “=⇒” follows from a similar and simplified argument.
Instead of proving Claim 1 as in (i), one proves ψ |= ¬χ.
Now, we are ready to give the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. (i) Let φ be an L-formula of I. By Theorem 2.3(ii) there exists
an L(R)-sentence τφ(R) of Σ
1
1 such that for all modelsM and teamsX ,
M |=X ∼˙φ ⇐⇒ M 6|=X φ orX = /0 ⇐⇒ (M,rel(X)) |= ¬τφ(R)∨∀~x¬R~x. (4)
Now, to prove the direction “⇐=”, assume that τφ(R) is equivalent to a first-order
sentence. Then, the sentence ¬τφ(R) is also equivalent to a first-order sentence, and
thus by Theorem 2.3(iv) there exists a formula ρ(¬τφ) of I such that for all L-models
M and teamsX ,
M |=X ρ(¬τφ) ⇐⇒ (M,rel(X)) |= ¬τφ(R)∨∀~x¬R~x.
It then follows from (4) that ρ(¬τφ)≡ ∼˙φ.
Finally, to prove the direction “=⇒”, assume that ∼˙φ ≡ ψ for some formula ψ of
I. By Theorem 2.3(ii) there exists an L(R)-sentence τψ(R) of Σ
1
1 such that for all
modelsM and teams X ,
M |=X ψ ⇐⇒ (M,rel(X)) |= τψ(R).
By (4) and the correspondence between teams and relations, τψ(R)≡¬τφ(R)∨∀~x¬R~x
and thereby the formula ¬τφ(R)∨∀~x¬R~x belongs to Σ
1
1. For any model M , since
M |= /0 φ, we have (M, /0) |= τφ(R), where rel( /0) = /0. Then, by Theorem 3.3(i), we
conclude that τφ(R) is equivalent to a first-order formula.
(ii) This item is proved by a similar argument that makes use of Theorem 2.3(i) and
Theorem 3.3(ii).
4. Axiomatizing negatable consequences in dependence and independence logic
Dependence and independence logic are not (effectively) axiomatizable, meaning
that the consequence relation Γ |= φ cannot be effectively axiomatized. Nevertheless,
if we restrict Γ to a set of sentences and φ to a first-order sentence, the consequence
relation Γ |= φ is (effectively) axiomatizable and explicit axiomatizations for D and I
are given in [22] and [11]. Throughout this section, let L denote one of the logics of D
and I, and ⊢L denote the syntactic consequence relation associated with the deduction
system of L defined in [22] or in [11].
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Theorem 4.1 (see [22, 11]). If Γ is a set of sentences of L, and φ is a first-order
sentence, then Γ |= φ ⇐⇒ Γ ⊢L φ. In particular, Γ |=⊥ ⇐⇒ Γ ⊢L ⊥.
Kontinen [17] generalized the above axiomatization result to cover also the case
when Γ∪ {φ} is a set of formulas (that possibly contain free variables) by adding a
new relation symbol to interpret the teams associated with the free variables. In this
section, we will generalize Theorem 4.1 without expanding the signature to cover the
case when Γ∪{φ} is a set of formulas (that possibly contain free variables) and φ is
negatable.
First, note that by applying the following (standard) existential quantifier introduc-
tion and elimination rule (included in the systems given in [22] and [11]):
φ(t/x)
∃I
∃xφ
D1
∃xφ
[φ]
D2
ψ
∃E
ψ
x does not occur freely in ψ or any formula in the
undischarged assumptions of the derivation D2
under certain constraint the (possibly open) formula ψ in the entailment ∆,ψ ⊢L θ can
be turned into a sentence without affecting the entailment relation, as the lemma below
shows.
Lemma 4.2. Let ∆∪{χ,θ} be a set of formulas of L. If the free variables x1, . . . ,xn of
χ do not occur freely in θ or any formula in ∆, then ∆,χ⊢L θ ⇐⇒ ∆,∃x1 . . .∃xnχ⊢L θ.
Proof. Apply the rules ∃I and ∃E.
To understand intuitively why Theorem 4.1 can be generalized, let us consider a
set Γ∪{φ} of formulas of L. Since L is equivalent to Σ11 by Theorem 2.3, and Σ
1
1 ad-
mits the Compactness Theorem, we may assume that Γ is a finite set. We shall add
to the deduction system of L the (sound) rule to guarantee that Γ ⊢ φ follows from
Γ,∼˙φ ⊢ ⊥. The latter, by Lemma 4.2, is equivalent to ∃~x(
∧
Γ∧ ∼˙φ) ⊢ ⊥, where ~x
lists all free variables in Γ and φ. Then, the Completeness Theorem can be restated
as ∃~x(
∧
Γ∧ ∼˙φ) 6⊢ ⊥ =⇒ ∃~x(
∧
Γ∧ ∼˙φ) 6|= ⊥. Assuming that ∃~x(
∧
Γ∧ ∼˙φ) is de-
ductively consistent, the problem reduces to the problem of constructing a model for
the sentence ∃~x(
∧
Γ∧ ∼˙φ), which further reduces to the problem of constructing a
model for the Σ11 sentence τ∃~x(
∧
Γ∧∼˙φ), in case ∼˙φ is definable in L. Finding a model
for τ∃~x(
∧
Γ∧∼˙φ), which we may assume to have the form ∃~Rθ, is the same as finding
a model for the first-order formula θ. This argument shows that via the trick of weak
classical negation, Theorem 4.1 can, in principle, be generalized. Note that if Γ is a set
of sentences and φ is a first-order sentence, then ¬φ≡ ∼˙φ and the foregoing argument
reduces to the argument given in [22].
Let us now make this idea precise. Given the Completeness Theorems in [22] and
[11], it suffices to extend the systems natural deduction of [22] and [11] by adding the
following (usual) elimination rule for the weak classical negation below to ensure that
Γ ⊢ φ follows from Γ,∼˙φ ⊢ ⊥ in case φ is negatable, where we use ∼˙φ as a shorthand
for the (up to equivalence unique) formula ψ in the language of L such that ψ ≡ ∼˙φ:
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NEW RULE
[∼˙φ]
...
⊥
∼˙E
φ
Let ⊢∗
L
denote the syntactic consequence relation associated with the system of L
extended with the rule ∼˙ E. We now prove the Soundness and Completeness Theorem
for this extended system.
Theorem 4.3. If Γ∪{φ} is a set of formulas of L such that φ is negatable, then we
have Γ |= φ ⇐⇒ Γ ⊢∗
L
φ.
Proof. “⇐=”: The soundness of the rules of the systems of L follows from [22] and
[11], and the new rule ∼˙E is clearly sound.
“=⇒”: Since L is compact, we may w.l.o.g. assume Γ to be finite. Then, we have
Γ |= φ=⇒ Γ,∼˙φ |=⊥=⇒∃x¯(
∧
Γ∧∼˙φ) |=⊥
=⇒∃x¯(
∧
Γ∧∼˙φ) ⊢L ⊥ (by the Completeness Theorem of L, Theorem 4.1)
=⇒ Γ,∼˙φ ⊢L ⊥ (by Lemma 4.2)
=⇒ Γ ⊢∗
L
φ, (by ∼˙E)
where ∼˙φ is a shorthand for the formulaψ in the language of L such that ψ≡ ∼˙φ.
If φ(~x) is first-order formula, then its Σ11-translation is equivalent to the first-order
sentence τφ(R) = ∀~x(R(~x)→ φ(~x)). We thus know by Theorem 3.2 that φ is negatable
in I, and also in D in case φ is a sentence. This shows that our Theorem 4.3 is indeed
a generalization of Theorem 4.1 and also of [17] for I.
Let us stress here that the new rule ∼˙E in the extended system is to be applied only
to negatable formulas φ, and the defining formula of ∼˙φ in the original language of
the logic L has to be computed before applying the rule. Since the class of negatable
formulas is undecidable (as discussed in Section 3) in the first place, the rule ∼˙E is not
entirely effective. Nevertheless, in the next section we will identify an interesting (de-
cidable) class of negatable formulas in I whose weak classical negations have uniform
translations in I. For this and possibly other interesting classes of negatable formulas
the rule ∼˙E is applicable effectively.
We now end this section by providing a uniform translation in I for the weak clas-
sical negation ∼˙φ of every first-order formula φ. The translation we give in the propo-
sition below is much more efficient and succinct than the translation obtained by going
back and forth through the lengthy Σ11-translation of the formula (i.e. by applying The-
orem 2.3(ii)(iv), see [27, 6] for details).
Proposition 4.4. If φ is a first-order formula, then ∼˙φ(~x) ≡ ∃~w(~w ⊆ ~x∧¬φ(~w)),
where ~w is a sequence of fresh variables.
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Proof. For any modelM and teamX , since φ is flat, we have
M |=X ∼˙φ ⇐⇒ X = /0 orM 6|=X φ ⇐⇒ X = /0 or ∃s ∈X(M 6|={s} φ(~x)).
In view of the empty team property of I, it suffices to show that for any nonempty team
X ,
∃s ∈X(M 6|={s} φ(~x)) ⇐⇒ M |=X ∃~w(~w ⊆ ~x∧¬φ(~w)).
“=⇒”: Let ~x = 〈x1, . . . ,xn〉. Assume M 6|={s} φ(~x) for some s ∈ X . Define
inductively a constant function Fi for each 1≤ i≤ n as follows:
• F1 :X→ ℘(M)\ { /0} is defined as F1(t) = {s(x1)};
• Fi :X(F1/w1, . . . ,Fi−1/wi−1)→ ℘(M)\ { /0} is defined as Fi(t) = {s(xi)}.
Clearly,X(~F/~w) =X(s(~x)/~w), and thusM |=X(~F/~w) ~w ⊆ ~x. On the other hand, for
any t ∈ X(~F/~w), since t(~w) = s(~x) and M 6|={s} φ(~x), we obtain M 6|={t} φ(~w) by
the locality property, which means M |={t} ¬φ(~w) by the law of excluded middle for
first-order formulas. Hence, we obtainM |=X(~F/~w) ¬φ(~w) by the flatness property.
“⇐=”: Conversely, suppose M |=X ∃~w(~w ⊆ ~x∧¬φ(~w)). Then there exist ap-
propriate functions Fi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) for the existential quantifications ∃~w such that
M |=X(~F/~w) ~w ⊆ ~x andM |=X(~F/~w) ¬φ(~w). The latter implies thatM 6|={t} φ(~w) for
an arbitrary t ∈X(~F/~w). On the other hand, by the former, there exists s′ ∈X(~F/~w)
such that s′(~x) = t(~w). For s= s′ ↾ dom(X)∈X , we have s(~x) = s′(~x) = t(~w), which
impliesM 6|={s} φ(~x) by the locality property.
5. A hierarchy of negatable atoms
In this section, we define an interesting class of formulas that are negatable in I.
This class will be presented in the form of an alternating hierarchy of atoms that are
definable in I, and the weak classical negation of each such atom also falls in this hier-
archy. These atoms are closely related to the dependency notions considered in [8], and
the generalized dependence atoms studied in [23] and [18]. We will demonstrate that
all first-order formulas, dependence atoms, independence atoms and inclusion atoms
belong to this class. At the end of the section, we will also show that the set of negat-
able formulas is closed under Boolean connectives and the weak quantifiers. For all
this type of negatable formulas, the Completeness Theorem of I we obtained in the
previous section applies, and in this section we will also give uniform translations for
the weak classical negations of these negatable formulas in I.
Let us start by defining the notion of abstract relation. A k-ary abstract relation R
is a class of pairs (M,RM ) that is closed under isomorphisms, where M ranges over
first-order models and RM ⊆Mk. For instance, the familiar equality = is a binary
abstract relation defined by the class
{(M,=M ) |M is a first-order model}, where =M := {(a,a) | a ∈M}.
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Every first-order formula φ(x1, . . . ,xk) with k free variables induces a k-ary abstract
relation
φ := {(M,φM ) |M is a first-order model},
where φM := {(s(x1), . . . ,s(xk)) |M |=s φ}. A k-ary abstract relation R is said to be
(first-order) definable if there exists a (first-order) formula φR(w1, . . . ,wk) such that
for all modelsM and assignments s,
s(~w) ∈RM ⇐⇒ M |=s φR(~w).
Clearly, the first-order formula w = u defines the abstract equality relation, and every
first-order formula φ defines its associated abstract relation φ.
If R is a k-ary abstract relation, then we write R for the complement of R that is
defined by letting R
M
=Mk \RM for all modelsM . Clearly, if a first-order formula
φ defines R, then its negation ¬φ defines R.
If ~s = 〈s1, . . . ,sk〉, then we write ~s(~x) for 〈s1(~x), . . . ,sk(~x)〉. For every sequence
k = 〈k1, . . . ,kn〉 of natural numbers and every (k1+ · · ·+kn) ·m-ary abstract relation
R, we introduce two new atomic formulas ΣRn,k(x1, . . . ,xm) and Π
R
n,k(x1, . . . ,xm)with
the semantics defined as follows:
• M |= /0 Σ
R
n,k(~x) andM |= /0 Π
R
n,k(~x).
• If n is odd, then define for any modelM and any nonempty teamX ,
– M |=X Σ
R
n,k(~x) iff there exist s11, . . . ,s1k1 ∈X such that for all s21, . . . ,s2k2 ∈
X , there exist . . . there exist sn1, . . . ,snkn ∈X such that (~s1(~x), . . . , ~sn(~x))∈
RM ;
– M |=X Π
R
n,k(~x) iff for all s11, . . . ,s1k1 ∈X , there exist s21, . . . ,s2k2 ∈X
such that for all . . . for all sn1, . . . ,snkn ∈X , it holds that (~s1(~x), . . . , ~sn(~x))∈
RM .
• Similarly if n is even.
Fact 5.1. ∼˙ΣRn,k(~x)≡ Π
R
n,k(~x) and ∼˙Π
R
n,k(~x)≡ Σ
R
n,k(~x).
Let us now give some examples of the ΣRn,k and Π
R
n,k atoms.
Example 5.2. (a) The dependence atom =(x1, . . . ,xk,y) is the Π
depk
1,〈2〉(x1, . . . ,xk,y)
atom, where depk is the 2(k+ 1)-ary abstract relation defined as
(a1, . . . ,ak, b,a
′
1, . . . ,a
′
k, b
′) ∈ (depk)
M iff a1, . . . ,ak = a
′
1, . . . ,a
′
k =⇒ b = b
′.
Clearly, depk is definable by the first-order formula
φdepk =
(
w1 = w
′
1∧·· ·∧wk = w
′
k
)
→ u= u′.
(b) The independence atom x1, . . . ,xk ⊥z1,...,zn y1, . . . ,ym is the
Π
indkmn
2,〈2,1〉 (x1, . . . ,xk,y1, . . . ,ym,z1, . . . ,zn)
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atom, where indkmn is the (first-order definable) (2+1)(k+m+n)-ary abstract
relation defined as (~a,~b,~c, ~a′, ~b′, ~c′, ~a′′, ~b′′, ~c′′) ∈ (indkmn)
M iff
(cn, . . . , cn) = (c
′
1, . . . , c
′
n) =⇒ [c1, . . . , cn = c
′′
1 , . . . , c
′′
n,
a′′1 , . . . ,a
′′
k = a1, . . . ,ak and b
′′
1 , . . . , b
′′
m = b
′
1, . . . , b
′
m ].
(c) The inclusion atom x1, . . . ,xk ⊆ y1, . . . ,yk is the Π
inck
2,〈1,1〉
(x1, . . . ,xk,y1, . . . ,yk)
atom, where inck is the (first-order definable) (1+ 1)2k-ary abstract relation
defined as
(a1, . . . ,ak, b1, . . . , bk,a
′
1, . . . ,a
′
k, b
′
1, . . . , b
′
k)∈ (inck)
M iff a1, . . . ,ak = b
′
1, . . . , b
′
k.
(d) Every first-order formula φ(x1, . . . ,xk) is the Π
φ
1,〈1〉(x1, . . . ,xk) atom, where φ is
the (first-order definable) 1 ·k-ary abstract relation defined as
(a1, . . . ,ak) ∈φ
M iff M |=s~a φ where s~a(xi) = ai for all i.
In what follows, let k = 〈k1, . . . ,kn〉 be an arbitrary sequence of natural numbers,
~x = 〈x1, . . . ,xm〉 an arbitrary sequence of variables, and R an arbitrary (k1 + · · ·+
kn)m-ary abstract relation. Suppose R is definable by a formula φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn),
where # „wi = 〈wi,1, . . . ,wi,ki〉 and wi,j = 〈wi,j,1, . . . ,wi,j,m〉. The Σ
R
n,k(~x) and Π
R
n,k(~x)
atoms can be translated into second-order logic in the same manner as in Theorem 2.3.
For instance, if n is odd, let S be a freshm-ary relation symbol and let τ
ΣR
n,k
(S) :=
∃ # „w1
(
S(w1,1)∧·· ·∧ S(w1,k1)∧∀
# „w2
(
S(w2,1)∧·· ·∧S(w2,k2)→∃
# „w3 · · ·
· · ·∃ #  „wn
(
S(wn,1)∧·· ·∧S(wn,kn)∧φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn)
)
· · ·
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
.
It is easy to verify thatM |=X Σ
R
n,k(~x) ⇐⇒ (M,rel(X)) |= τΣR
n,k
(S) for any modelM
and teamX . If φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn) is a first-order formula, i.e., ifR is first-order definable,
then τ
ΣR
n,k
(S) is a first-order sentence. Therefore, by Theorem 3.2(i), the ΣRn,k(~x) and
Π
R
n,k(~x) atoms with first-order definable R are negatable in I.
In order to apply the rules of the extended deduction system defined in Section 4 to
derive the ΣRn,k(~x) and Π
R
n,k(~x) consequences in I, one needs to compute the formulas
that are equivalent to the weak classical negations of the ΣRn,k(~x) and Π
R
n,k(~x) atoms in
the original language of I. This can be done by applying Fact 5.1 and going back and
forth through the Σ11-translation, which is however inefficient. In what follows, we will
give a direct definition of the atoms ΣRn,k(~x) and Π
R
n,k(~x) in the original language of I.
For each 1≤ i≤ n, recall # „wi = 〈wi,1, . . . ,wi,ki〉, and define
• inc( # „wi;~x) :=
ki∧
j=1
wi,j ⊆ ~x,
• pro( # „w1, . . . ,
#      „wi−1;~x;
# „wi) :=
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# „w1 . . .
#      „wi−1 ⊥
# „wi ∧
ki∧
j=1
(
~x⊆ wi,j ∧ 〈wi,j′ | j
′ 6= j〉⊥ wi,j
)
2.
Define then inductively formulas σi and πi as follows:
• σ1[~x,φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn)] := ∃
#  „wn
(
inc( #  „wn;~x)∧φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn)
)
,
• π1[~x,φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn)] := ∃
#  „wn
(
pro( # „w1, . . . ,
#        „wn−1;~x;
#  „wn)∧φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn)
)
,
• σi+1[~x,φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn)] := ∃
#       „wn−i
(
inc( #       „wn−i;~x)∧πi[~x,φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn)]
)
,
• πi+1[~x,φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn)] := ∃
#       „wn−i
(
pro( # „w1, . . . ,
#             „wn−i−1;~x;
#       „wn−i)
∧σi[~x,φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn)]
)
.
Theorem 5.3. Let R and φR be as above. Then
• ΣRn,k(~x)≡ σn[~x,φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn)],
• ΠRn,k(~x)≡ πn[~x,φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn)].
Before proving the above theorem, let us consider some examples. As discussed
in Example 5.2(a), the dependence atom =(x1, . . . ,xk,y) is a Π
depk
1,〈2〉
(~xy). By Fact 5.1,
the weak classical negation ∼˙=(~x,y) of the dependence atom is the atom Σ
depk
1,〈2〉
(~xy),
which, according to the above theorem, is expressible in I by the formula
σ1[~xy,φdepk ] = ∃~w1v1 ~w2v2(~w1v1 ⊆ ~xy ∧ ~w2v2 ⊆ ~xy ∧ ~w1 = ~w2 ∧ v1 6= v2). (5)
The weak classical negation of independence atoms and inclusion atoms (which are
Σ
R
2,k atoms) can be computed from the above theorem in the same way. There are also
more succinct definitions for these negated atoms than the ones obtained by applying
the above theorem:
∼˙~x⊥~z ~y ≡ ∃
1~u~v ~w(~u~w ⊆ ~x~z ∧ ~v ~w ⊆ ~y~z ∧ ~u~v ~w 6= ~x~y~z), (6)
∼˙~x⊆ ~y ≡ ∃1~z(~z ⊆ ~x ∧ ~z 6= ~y),
where the quantifier ∃1 is defined as ∃1xφ := ∃x(=(x)∧φ) (and we will come back to
this quantifier later in the section). Finding simpler translations for other ΣRn,k and Π
R
n,k
atoms with small n is left as future work.
Now, to prove Theorem 5.3, let us first prove a lemma concerning the crucial sub-
formulas inc and pro in the σn and πn formulas. In the following, for any team Y
of a model M , we write Y [~x] for the image of Y on ~x, i.e., Y [~x] = {s(~x) | s ∈ Y }.
For any set A ⊆ Mn of tuples in M and sequence w = 〈w1, . . . ,wn〉 of variables,
define Y (A/w) = {s(a1/w1) . . . (an/wn) | s ∈ X, 〈a1, . . . ,an〉 ∈ A}. We abbreviate
X(A/w1) · · · (A/wk) as X(A/w1, · · · ,wk), and write simplyX(a/w) forX({a}/w).
2If i= 1, then # „w1 . . .
#      „
wi−1 denotes the empty sequence 〈〉, and we stipulate 〈〉⊥ ~y :=⊤ for any ~y.
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Lemma 5.4. Let 1≤ i≤ n,M a model and Y a nonempty team.
(i) M |=Y inc(
# „wi;~x) iff Y [wi,j ]⊆ Y [~x] for all 1≤ j ≤ ki.
(ii) If
Y (Y [~x]/wi,1, . . . ,wi,ki)[
# „w1, . . . ,
# „wi] = Y [
# „w1, . . . ,
# „wi], (7)
thenM |=Y pro(
# „w1, . . . ,
#      „wi−1;~x;
# „wi).
For the converse direction, ifM |=Y pro(
# „w1, . . . ,
#      „wi−1;~x;
# „wi), then
Y (Y [~x]/ # „wi)[
# „w1, . . . ,
# „wi]⊆ Y [
# „w1, . . . ,
# „wi]. (8)
Proof. Item (i) is obvious. For item (ii), the direction that (7) implies the clauseM |=Y
pro( # „w1, . . . ,
#      „wi−1;~x;
# „wi) is clear. We only give a detailed proof for the other direction.
Suppose that M |=Y pro(
# „w1, . . . ,
#      „wi−1;~x;
# „wi). To prove (8), for an arbitrary el-
ement 〈 #„a1, . . . ,
#„ai〉 ∈ Y (Y [~x]/wi,1, . . . ,wi,ki)[
# „w1, . . . ,
# „wi], we show that 〈
#„a1, . . . ,
#„ai〉 ∈
Y [ # „w1, . . . ,
# „wi] as well. By definition, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ ki, there exists sj ∈ Y such
that sj(~x) = ai,j . Moreover, since M |=Y ~x ⊆ wi,j , there exists s
′
j ∈ Y such that
s′j(wi,j) = sj(~x) = ai,j .
Now, since M |=Y 〈wi,1,wi,3, . . . ,wi,ki〉 ⊥ wi,2, we can find s
′′
2 ∈ Y such that
s′′2(wi,1,wi,2)= s
′
1(wi,1)s
′
2(wi,2). Also, sinceM |=Y 〈wi,1,wi,2,wi,4, . . . ,wi,ki〉⊥wi,3,
there exists s′′3 ∈ Y such that
s′′3(wi,1,wi,2,wi,3) = s
′′
2(wi,1,wi,2)s
′
3(wi,3) = s
′
1(wi,1)s
′
2(wi,2)s
′
3(wi,3).
Proceeding in a similar way we find in the end an s′′ki ∈ Y such that
s′′ki(
# „wi) = s
′
1(wi,1) . . . s
′
ki
(wi,ki) = s1(~x) . . . ski(~x) = ai,1 . . .ai,ki =
#„ai.
Now, the assumption 〈 #„a1, . . . ,
#„ai〉 ∈ Y (Y [~x]/wi,1, . . . ,wi,ki)[
# „w1, . . . ,
# „wi] also im-
plies that there is s ∈ Y such that s( # „w1, . . . ,
#      „wi−1) = 〈
#„a1, . . . ,
#     „ai−1〉. Since M |=Y
# „w1 . . .
#      „wi−1 ⊥
# „wi, it follows that there exists s
′ ∈ Y such that
s′( # „w1, . . . ,
#      „wi−1,
# „wi) = s(
# „w1, . . . ,
#      „wi−1)s
′′
ki
( # „wi) = 〈
#„a1, . . . ,
#     „ai−1,
#„ai〉.
From this we conclude that 〈 #„a1, . . . ,
#„ai〉 ∈ Y [
# „w1, . . . ,
#      „wi−1,
# „wi].
Having proved the above lemma, let us remark that Ro¨nnholm introduced in [26]
the so-called inclusion quantifiers (∃~w⊆ ~x) and (∀~w⊆ ~x), which are closely related to
our σn and πn formulas. The existential inclusion quantification (∃~w ⊆ ~x)φ is defined
to be true on a team X in a model M , if and only if there exists a sequence ~F of
functions for the standard existential quantifications ∃~w such that the team X(~F/~x)
generated by these functions should satisfy φ and also respect the inclusion atom ~w⊆ ~x,
namely,M |=X( #„F /~w) (~w ⊆ ~x)∧φ. It is then straightforward to see that
∃wi,j(inc(wi,j ;~x)∧φ)≡ (∃wi,j ⊆ ~x)φ.
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On the other hand, a universal inclusion quantification (∀~w ⊆ ~x)φ is defined to be true
on a team X , if and only if the team X(X [~x]/~w) satisfies φ. It then follows from
Lemma 5.4(ii) that
(∀wi,1 ⊆ ~x) . . . (∀wi,ki ⊆ ~x)φ |= ∃
# „wi(pro(
# „w1, . . . ,
#      „wi−1;~x;
# „wi)∧φ).
Without going into further detail we point out that our σn and πn formulas can be
expressed in terms of the inclusion quantifiers, as, e.g.,
σ2[~x,φR(w1,w2)]≡ (∃w1 ⊆ ~x)(∀w2 ⊆ ~x)φR(w1,w2).
We refer the reader to Section 3.3.3 of the dissertation of Ro¨nnholm [25] for further
discussions, and now we turn to the proof of Theorem 5.3.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. We only give the detailed proof for ΣRn,k(x1, . . . ,xm) when n is
odd. The other cases can be proved analogously.
SupposeM |=X σn[~x,φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn)] for some modelM and nonempty teamX ,
where
σn[~x,φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn)] := ∃
# „w1
(
inc( # „w1;~x)∧∃
# „w2
(
pro( # „w1;~x;
# „w2)∧·· · · · ·∧
∃ #  „wn
(
inc( #  „wn;~x)∧φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn)
)
· · ·
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
.
Let
# „
F1, . . . ,
#  „
Fn be a sequence of functions for the existential quantifications∃
# „w1, . . . ,∃
#  „wn
in σn and Y =X(
# „
F1, . . . ,
#  „
Fn/
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn) such thatM |=Y inc(
# „wi;~x) for any odd i≤n,
M |=Y pro(
# „w1, . . . ,
# „wi;~x;
#      „wi+1) for any odd i < n, andM |=Y φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn).
To show thatM |=X Σ
R
n,k(~x), take any t ∈ Y . SinceM |=Y inc(w1,1, . . . ,w1,k1 ;~x),
there exist s1,1, . . . ,s1,k1 ∈X such that
s1,1(~x) = t(w1,1), . . . ,s1,k1(~x) = t(w1,k1).
Let s2,1, . . . ,s2,k2 ∈ X be arbitrary. Since M |=Y pro(
# „w1;~x;w2,1, . . . ,w2,k2), we have
by Lemma 5.4(ii) that
Y (Y [~x]/w2,1, . . . ,w2,k2)[
# „w1,
# „w2]⊆ Y [
# „w1,
# „w2],
which implies that there exist t2 ∈ Y such that
t2(
# „w1) = t(
# „w1) =
#„s1(~x) and t2(w2,1) = s2,1(~x), . . . , t2(w2,k2) = s2,k2(~x).
Repeat the argument n times to find in the same manner the assignments #„s3 ∈
Xk3 , #„s5 ∈ X
k5 , . . . , # „sn ∈ X
kn and the corresponding assignments t4, t6, . . . , tn−1 ∈ Y
for arbitrary #„s4 ∈X
k4 , #„s6 ∈X
k6 , . . . , #      „sn−1 ∈X
kn−1 . In the last step we have
tn−1(
# „w1) =
#„s1(~x), . . . , tn−1(
#        „wn−1) =
#      „sn−1(~x)
and there exist sn,1, . . . ,sn,kn ∈X such that
sn,1(~x) = tn−1(wn,1), . . . ,sn,kn(~x) = tn−1(wn,kn).
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Since M |=Y φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
# „wn), we have M |={tn−1} φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
# „wn) by the downward
closure property of first-order formulas. Since the formula φR defines R, we conclude
(tn−1(
# „w1), . . . , tn−1(
#  „wn)) ∈R
M , thereby ( #„s1(~x), . . . ,
# „sn(~x)) ∈R
M .
Conversely, suppose M |=X Σ
R
n,k(~x) for some model M and nonempty team X .
Then
(∃ #„s1 ∈X
k1)(∀ #„s2 ∈X
k2) · · · · · ·(∃ # „sn ∈X
kn)( #„s1(~x), . . . ,
# „sn(~x)) ∈R
M . (9)
To show that M |=X σn[~x,φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn)], consider s1,1, . . . ,s1,k1 ∈ X . One
can define a sequence
#     „
F1,1, . . . ,
#       „
F1,k1 of functions for the existential quantifications
∃w1,1 . . .∃w1,k1 in σn such that
X(
#     „
F1,1, . . . ,
#       „
F1,k1/w1,1, . . . ,w1,k1) =X(s1,1(~x), . . . ,s1,k1(~x)/w1,1, . . . ,w1,k1).
Put Y1 = X(
#     „
F1,1, . . . ,
#       „
F1,k1/w1,1, . . . ,w1,k1). Clearly, we have M |=Y1 w1,j ⊆ ~x for
all 1 ≤ j ≤ k1, namely, M |=Y1 inc(
# „w1;~x). It then remains to show that M |=Y1
πn−1[~x,φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn)].
Now, consider the quantifications ∃w2,2 . . .∃w2,k2 in πn−1. One can define a se-
quence
#     „
F2,1, . . . ,
#       „
F2,k2 of functions such that
Y1(
#     „
F2,1, . . . ,
#       „
F2,k2/w2,1, . . . ,w2,k2) = Y1(X [~x]/w2,1, . . . ,w2,k2). (10)
Put Y2 = Y1(
#     „
F2,1, . . . ,
#       „
F2,k2/w2,1, . . . ,w2,k2). Since Y2(Y2[~x]/
# „w2) = Y1(X [~x]/
# „w2) =
Y2, we obtain by Lemma 5.4(ii) that M |=Y2 pro(
# „w1;~x;
# „w2). It then remains to show
thatM |=Y2 σn−2[~x;φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn)].
For each t ∈ Y2, by (10), there exists
#   „st,2 = 〈s
t
2,1, . . . ,s
t
2,k2
〉 ∈Xk2 such that
st2,1(~x) = t(w2,1), . . . ,s
t
2,k2
(~x) = t(w2,k2).
Hence, by (9), there exists #   „st,3 = 〈s
t
3,1, . . . ,s
t
3,k3
〉 ∈Xk3 such that
(∀ #„s4 ∈X
k4) · · · · · · (∃ # „sn ∈X
kn)( #„s1(~x),
#   „st,2(~x),
#   „st,3(~x),
#„s4(~x) . . . ,
# „sn(~x)) ∈R
M .
One can define a sequence
#     „
F3,1, . . . ,
#       „
F3,k3 of functions for the existential quantifications
∃w3,1 . . .∃w3,k3 in σn−2 such that for all t ∈ Y3 = Y2(
#     „
F3,1, . . . ,
#       „
F3,k3/w3,1, . . . ,w3,k3),
t(w3,1) = s
t
3,1(~x), . . . , t(w3,k3) = s
t
3,k3
(~x),
where we use the same notation t to denote also t ↾ dom(Y2) ∈ Y2. This definition
implies immediately that M |=Y3 inc(
# „w3;~x). It then remains to show that M |=Y3
πn−3[~x;φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn)].
For the existential quantifications ∃w4,1 . . .∃w4,k4 in πn−3, we construct the se-
quence
#     „
F4,1, . . . ,
#       „
F4,k4 of functions such that Y4 = Y3(
#     „
F4,1, . . . ,
#       „
F4,k4/w4,1, . . . ,w4,k4) =
Y3(X [~x]/
# „w4), and proceed in the same way as above. Repeat the same argument n
times. In the last step we have the team Yn defined and M |=Yn inc(
#  „wn;~x). It then
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only remains to show that M |=Yn φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn). Since φR is flat, this reduces to
showing thatM |={t} φR holds for any t ∈ Yn. By the definition of Yn, we have
( #„s1(~x),
#   „st,2(~x),
#   „st,3(~x),
#   „st,4(~x) . . . ,
#    „st,n(~x)) ∈R
M
and t( # „w1) =
#„s1(~x), t(
# „w2) =
#   „st,2(~x), . . . , t(
#  „wn) =
#    „st,n(~x),
which implyM |={t} φR(
# „w1, . . . ,
#  „wn), as the first-order formula φR defines R.
Having identified a hierarchy of negatable formulas, a natural question to ask is
whether it is possible to extend the hierarchy in some way while keeping the negatabil-
ity of the formulas. Let us now try to provide an answer to this question.
Recall that the Σ11-translations for the disjunction ∨, the existential quantifier ∃ and
universal quantifier ∀ as given in [27] are as follows:
• τφ∨ψ(R) = ∃S∃S
′(τφ(S)∧ τψ(S
′)∧∀~x(R~x→ (S~x∨S ′~x))),
• τ∃xφ(x,~y)(R) = ∃S(τφ(S)∧∀~y(R~y→∃xSx~y)),
• τ∀xφ(x,~y)(R) = ∃S(τφ(S)∧∀~y(R~y→∀xSx~y)).
These translations can well be non-first-order sentences, and thus none of ∨, ∃ and ∀
preserve negatability. Nevertheless, in the literature there are other variants of these
logical constants, under which the set of negatable formulas is closed, such as the
disjunction
>
(introduced in [1], known in the literature by the name intuitionistic
disjunction or Boolean disjunction), the (weak) existential quantifier ∃1 and the (weak)
universal quantifier ∀1 (introduced in [20]) whose semantics are defined as follows:
• M |=X φ
>
ψ iff M |=X φ orM |=X ψ.
• M |=X ∃
1xφ iff M |=X(a/x) φ for some a ∈M .
• M |=X ∀
1xφ iff M |=X(a/x) φ for all a ∈M .
Clearly, for all formulas φ of D or I, all modelsM and all teamsX ,
M |=X φ
>
ψ ⇐⇒ (M,rel(X)) |= τφ(R)∨ τψ(R),
M |=X ∃
1xφ ⇐⇒ (M,rel(X)) |= ∃xτφ(R)
and
M |=X ∀
1xφ ⇐⇒ (M,rel(X)) |= ∀xτφ(R).
In view of this, Theorem 2.3 can be generalized to cover extensions of D and I with
these three logical constants, and these three logical constants are then definable in D
and in I3. If τφ(R) and τψ(R) are both first-order, then the above three Σ
1
1-translations
τφ(R)∨ τψ(R), ∃xτφ(R) and ∀xτφ(R) are first-order as well. By Theorem 3.3, this
shows that the logical constants
>
, ∃1 and ∀1 preserve negatability. Furthermore, it is
easy to see that
3Moreover, ∃1 and
>
are uniformly definable in D and in I , since ∃1xφ ≡ ∃x(=(x)∧φ) and φ
>
ψ ≡
∃w∃u(=(w)∧=(u)∧ (w = u ∨φ)∧ (w 6= u ∨ψ)), where w,u are fresh variables.
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• ∼˙(φ∧ψ)≡ ∼˙φ
>
∼˙ψ, ∼˙(φ
>
ψ)≡ ∼˙φ∧∼˙ψ,
• ∼˙∃1xφ≡ ∀1x∼˙φ and ∼˙∀1xφ≡ ∃1x∼˙φ.
Without going into detail we remark that making use of the disjunction
>
the ex-
tended system of I can be applied to give a new formal proof of Arrow’s Impossibility
Theorem [3] in social choice theory. In [24] the theorem is formulated as an entailment
ΓArrow |= φdictator in independence logic, where ΓArrow is a set of formulas expressing
the conditions in Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem and φdictator is a formula expressing
the existence of a dictator. The formula φdictator is of the form
> n
i=1φi, where φi is
a first-order formula expressing that voter i is a dictator (among n voters). By what
we just obtained, the formula φdictator is negatable in I and the Completeness Theorem
guarantees that ΓArrow ⊢
∗
I
φdictator is derivable in our extended system.
6. Armstrong’s axioms and the Geiger-Paz-Pearl axioms
Dependence and independence atoms, being members of the hierarchy defined in
the previous section (see Example 5.2), are negatable in independence logic. Therefore,
Armstrong’s Axioms [2] that characterize dependence atoms and the Geiger-Paz-Pearl
axioms [9] that characterize independence atoms are derivable in our extended system
of independence logic. In this section, we provide the derivations of these axioms in
order to illustrate the power of our extended system.
Throughout this section we denote by ⊢ the syntactic consequence relation associ-
ated with the extended system of I defined in Section 4. The crucial rules from [11]
that we will apply in our derivations are ∃I, ∃E, the usual rules for identity (=) and the
following ones, where we write x,y,z, . . . for arbitrary sequences of variables:
⊆Id
x⊆ x
x⊆ y y ⊆ z
⊆Trs
x⊆ z
x1 . . .xn ⊆ y1 . . .yn
⊆Pro
xi1 . . .xik ⊆ yi1 . . . yik
y ⊆ x α(x)
⊆Cmp
α(y/x)
where {i1, . . . , ik} ⊆ {1, . . . ,n}. where α is first-order.
x⊥z y w1u1v1t1 ⊆ xyzs w2u2v2t2 ⊆ xyzs
⊥E
∃w3u3v3t3
(
w3u3v3t3 ⊆ xyzs∧ (v1 = v2 → w3u3v3 = w1u2v2)
)
where v1 = v2 → w3u3v3 = w1u2v2 is short for v1 6= v2∨w3u3v3 = w1u2v2.
To simplify the derivations, we will also use the following handy (sound) weakening
rule for inclusion atoms that was introduced essentially in [12]:
x⊆ y
⊆W
∃w(xw ⊆ yz)
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By applying the rule ⊆W we can easily derive a more general version of the ⊥E rule:
xx′ ⊥z yy
′ w1v1 ⊆ xz u2v2 ⊆ yz
⊥E
∃w3u3v3t3
(
w3u3v3t3 ⊆ xyzs∧ (v1 = v2 → w3u3v3 = w1u2v2)
)
We first derive Armstrong’s Axioms. To state these axioms in full generality, we
now introduce a generalized version of dependence atoms, atoms=(x,y) that can have
a sequence of variables in the last coordinate. The semantics of =(x,y) is defined as:
• M |=X =(x,y) iff for all s,s
′ ∈X , if s(x) = s′(x), then s(y) = s′(y).
Clearly, =(x,y) ≡ y ⊥x y, and we thus interpret the dependence atom =(x,y) in I as
the independence atom y ⊥x y.
Example 6.1. The following clauses, known as Armstrong’s Axioms [2], are derivable
in the extended system of I.
(1) ⊢=(x,x)
(2) =(x,y,z) ⊢=(y,x,z)
(3) =(x,x,y) ⊢=(x,y)
(4) =(y,z) ⊢=(x,y,z)
(5) =(x,y),=(y,z) ⊢=(x,z)
Proof. We only give the detailed derivation for item (5). By the rule ∼˙E, it suffices
to derive=(x,y),=(y,z),∼˙=(x,z) ⊢⊥, which, by the translation given in Theorem 5.3
(see also Formula (5)), is equivalent to
=(x,y),=(y,z),∃w1v1∃w2v2
(
w1v1 ⊆ xz ∧ w2v2 ⊆ xz ∧ w1 = w2 ∧ v1 6= v2
)
⊢ ⊥.
By ⊆W and ⊆Pro, it is sufficient to derive
=(x,y),=(y,z),∃w1u1v1∃w2u2v2(
w1u1v1 ⊆ xyz ∧ w2u2v2 ⊆ xyz ∧ w1 = w2 ∧ v1 6= v2
)
⊢ ⊥.
Further, by ∃E, it suffices to prove
=(x,y),=(y,z),w1u1v1 ⊆ xyz,w2u2v2 ⊆ xyz ⊢ w1 = w2 → v1 = v2. (11)
First, note that since ⊢ y= y, by ⊆Cmp we have
uu′ ⊆ yy ⊢ u= u′. (12)
Now, we derive
y⊥x y,w1u1v1 ⊆ xyz,w2u2v2 ⊆ xyz
⊢ ∃wuu′v
(
wuu′v ⊆ xyyz∧ (w1 = w2 → wuu
′ = w1u1u2)
)
(by the generalized⊥E)
⊢ w1 = w2 → u1 = u2. (by ⊆Pro and (12))
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Similarly, we can also derive
=(y,z),w1u1v1 ⊆ xyz,w2u2v2 ⊆ xyz ⊢ u1 = u2 → v1 = v2.
Hence, (11) follows (from the usual rules for first-order formulas that the system of
[11] contains).
Next, we derive the Geiger-Paz-Pearl axioms as follows.
Example 6.2. The following clauses, known as the Geiger-Paz-Pearl axioms [9], are
derivable in the extended system of I.
(1) x⊥ y ⊢ y⊥ x
(2) x⊥ y ⊢ z⊥ y, where z is a subsequence of x.
(3) x⊥ y ⊢ u⊥ v, where u and v are permutations of x and y, respectively
(4) x⊥ y, xy ⊥ z ⊢ x⊥ yz.
Proof. We only give the detailed derivation for item (4). By the rule ∼˙E, it suffices
to derive x⊥ y,xy ⊥ z,∼˙(x⊥ yz) ⊢ ⊥. Instead of applying Theorem 5.3, we will now
use the more succinct definition of ∼˙(x⊥ yz) as given in Equation (6), and the desired
clause is then equivalent to
x⊥ y,xy ⊥ z,∃1wuv(w ⊆ x ∧ uv ⊆ yz ∧ wuv 6= xyz) ⊢ ⊥.
By ∃E, it suffices to derive
Γ,x⊥ y,xy ⊥ z ,w ⊆ x ,uv ⊆ yz ,wuv 6= xyz ⊢ ⊥, (13)
where Γ = {=(o) | o is a variable from wuv}.
First, we derive by (the general version of) ⊥E that
x⊥ y, w⊆ x, uv ⊆ yz ⊢ ∃w1u1(w1u1 ⊆ xy∧w1u1 = wu). (14)
By ⊥E again, we derive
xy ⊥ z, w1u1 ⊆ xy, uv ⊆ yz ⊢ ∃w2u2v2(w2u2v2 ⊆ xyz∧w2u2v2 = w1u1v). (15)
Putting (14) and (15) together, by ∃E we obtain
x⊥ y,xy ⊥ z ,w⊆ x ,uv ⊆ yz ⊢ ∃w2u2v2(w2u2v2 ⊆ xyz∧w2u2v2 = wuv) ⊢ wuv⊆ xyz.
To derive (13) it is now sufficient to derive
Γ, wuv ⊆ xyz, wuv 6= xyz ⊢ ⊥. (16)
First, by ⊆W, we have wuv ⊆ xyz ⊢ ∃w′u′v′(w′u′v′wuv ⊆ wuvxyz). Moreover, by
⊆Cmp, we have w′u′v′wuv ⊆ wuvxyz,wuv 6= xyz ⊢ w′u′v′ 6= wuv. Putting these to-
gether, (16) is reduced, by ∃E, to
Γ, w′u′v′wuv⊆ wuvxyz, w′u′v′ 6= wuv ⊢ ⊥,
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and by ⊆Pro, further to
Γ, w′u′v′ ⊆ wuv, w′u′v′ 6= wuv ⊢ ⊥. (17)
Now, for an arbitrary variable o from the sequence wuv, we derive the following:
o⊥ o, o⊆ o,w′u′v′ ⊆ wuv ⊢ ∃pq(pq ⊆ oo∧pq = oo′) (by ⊥E)
⊢ o= o′. (by (12))
Since ⊢ o ⊆ o holds by ⊆Id, we conclude that o ⊥ o,w′u′v′ ⊆ wuv ⊢ o = o′ for any
variable o from wuv. Hence, we obtain Γ, w′u′v′ ⊆ wuv ⊢ w′u′v′ = wuv, from which
(17) follows.
7. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have extended the systems of natural deduction of dependence and
independence logic defined in [22] and [11] and obtained complete axiomatizations of
the negatable consequences in these logics. We have also given a characterization of
negatable formulas in I and negatable sentences in D. Determining whether a for-
mula of I or D is negatable is an undecidable problem. Nevertheless, we identified
an interesting class of negatable formulas, the Boolean and weak quantifier closure of
the class of ΣRn,k and Π
R
n,k atoms. First-order formulas, dependence and independence
atoms belong to this class. We also gave derivations of Armstrong’s axioms and the
Geiger-Paz-Pearl axioms in our extended system of I.
The results of this paper can be generalized in two directions. The first direction
is to identify other negatable formulas than those in the Boolean and weak quantifier
closure of the set of atoms from our hierarchy. The other direction is to analyze the
Σ
R
n,k and Π
R
n,k atoms in more detail. As we saw in Example 5.2, first-order formulas
and the atoms of dependence and independence belong to the Π1 or Π2 level. It is easy
to verify that ΠR1,k atoms (including first-order formulas and dependence atoms) are
closed downward, ΣR1,k atoms are closed upward, and Π
R
2,k atoms (including inclusion
atoms) are closed under unions. First-order logic extended with upward closed atoms
is shown in [7] to be equivalent to first-order logic. Adding other such atoms to first-
order logic results in many new logics that are less expressive than Σ11 or independence
logic and possibly stronger than first-order logic. These logics are potentially inter-
esting, because, among other properties, by the argument of this paper, the negatable
consequences in these logics can in principle be effectively axiomatized.
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